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IT may be of interest to consider a group of cases in which episodes have occurred having many of the characteristics of fully conscious behaviour but for which there is no subsequent recall.
What constitutes fully conscious behaviour? Sir Charles Sherrington (1940) writes: "Each of us at any moment of the waking day is a whole bundle of acts simultaneously proceeding. Among that bundle is a main or focal one which our conventional viewpoint stresses as the one which at the moment we are doing. . . . We are therefore at any moment a pattern of activity doing a single pattern of pieces all subordinate to one key piece." I suggest that where the "key piece", in Sherrington's sense, is properly adapted both to ,the perceptual situation calling it forth and to the balance of emotion and purpose in the individual, the behaviour may be said to be fully conscious.
Such behaviour requires adjustment not only to the immediately perceived setting and what has preceded it but also to a wider background of past experience. Without this continuity of experience which memory provides, behaviour would lack continuity, and episodes altogether isolated from the general experience may take place; these cannot usually be recalled.
Emotional and conative tendencies of the individual also assist in determining full consciousness. These can be regarded as internal stimuli to which the cognitive abilities are harnessed and normally maintain a balance which enables the various needs of the organism-psycho-biological and social-to be satisfied harmoniously. These two sets of factors-cognitive and dynamic-combine to maintain and direct adaptive behaviour.
In the ordinary hypnotic state, the perceptual field may be artificially restricted and some of its features inhibited by the operator. Experiences become isolated and the command of the hypnotist takes on an imperious aspect. Thus, when so directed, a hypnotized patient may proceed to shut a door which is already closed. The latter fact is ignored selectively in accordance with the command. Here then is an act of focal behaviour which superficially suggests fiilly conscious activity. It has an object or end in view, attention appears to be fully occupied with it, and appropriate means are taken to carry it out. But the act has no continuity with the past or future experience of the patient and the aim has no significance apart from its mere performance. --Such restricted experience in deep hypnosis cannot be recalled later in normal consciousness. For its recall a similar setting or orientation is necessary. An analogy in ordinary experience occurs when we fail to recognize a familiar face if the perceptual setting is different from that in which we are accustomed to see it.
The difficulty and apparent resistance to recall of hypnotic experiences cannot be regarded as an escape mechanism. The amnesia serves no immediately useful purpose. It has many of the characteristics of the fugue state but there is no advantage to be gained for the patient by forgetting. It is widely held that wherever there is forgetting of experiences, in the absence of a gross retention defect on an organic basis, the patient has a wittin,g or unwitting desire to forget. The case of post-hypnotic amnesia should help to dispel this notion.
An hypnotic state is commonly called a dissociated state and I shall use this term to cover all cases of restricted experience for which there is subsequent amnesia, irrespective of whether the amnesia is due to hypnotic, emotional or organic causes. I shall try to show that an organic retention defect may lead to the isolation Qf experiences in such a way as to render them inaccessible to ordinary recall.
In cases of head injury, after normal consciousness has returned, episodes of isolated behaviour may occur with subsequent amnesia which are closely analogous to the restricted, dissociated behaviour mentioned in connexion with hypnosis.
A young man aged 23, of average intelligence, sustained a severe closed contusional head injury. He was confused for four days, after which his disorientation and retention defect cleared up fairly rapidly. After fourteen days he was quite well orientated. He knew that he was in hospital and had had a head injurv. His retention defect was now relatively slight. Thus he could recall the events of the preceding few days with considerable accuracv. One evening at this time he was seen to emerge from his room completely in the nude apart from a belt. This he was carefully adjusting to his new girth as he walked along the hospital corridor. Asked by a nurse where he was going, he said he was walking home to see his wife. He had apparentlv discarded his pvjamnas but in his desire to get home quicklv had ignored the fact that he required clothes. But he decided to take the belt in the pocket of which were his valuables. A fewv hours later he had no recollection of this episode.
Here is an example of focal behaviour. The patient had a plan to go home to see his wife which he was able to formulate to the nurse. Further, he had taken some of the necessary means to that end. DLue to the restriction of his perceptual field, however, he had neglected other essential ones-his clothes, and apparently selectively also, the fact that his home was a hundred miles away.
His desire to be at home was very considerable but had been held in check against the background of other desires, restrictions and social inhibitions. In the drowsy state in the evening the controlling background was relaxed and the desire for home became isolated and dominant. It can be compared with the hypnotist's command, but arising from within rather than without.
The minor retention defect in this case reinforced the isolation of the desire to go home. When recent memorv is even slightly impaired the wider setting which falls outside what is immediatelv perceived fails to have its controlling influence.
The immediately past acts inconstantly and, when it fails, focal behaviour becomes relatively isolated. This isolation is analogous to the dissociation which takes place in hypnosis.
The subsequent failure of recall is a function of this isolation.
A second case of head injury is also instructive. A man aged 42 received a moderately severe contusional head injury. He was unconscious for one hour and confused for two to three hours. During his third dav in hospital he was quite well orientated in every sphere. He had some minor neurological signs and a mild retention defect. On the evening of the fourth dav in hospital he was observed to get up, put on a dressing-gown, take out his gas mask and put it on. He was not asleep. Looking afraid, he walked down the ward towards a nurse and asked to be guided to the air-raid shelter in spite of the fact that the ward was quiet and there was no air raid. He had no subsequent recollection of the incident. Here again is a piece of directed behaviour, correct in manv details, but overlooking important aspects of the true situation. In a state of restricted consciousness his fear of an air raid had become isolated and dominant. It had initiated a train of complicated actions wvith safetv as its immediate objective.
Here again the isolated drive, in this case fear, had a clear history. We discovered that a month prior to the accident the patient had been involved in a severe air raid wvhen visiting a much-bombed citv.
Similar amnesic episodes are relativelv common in other organic brain conditions. I will give one example to indicate other factors givir4g rise to the dissociated state.
A man, aged 42, was referred to us on account of an amnesic episode. One evening he had travelled to a near-bv village which he knew quite well to make a routine collection of rents. Five hours later he arrived at the first house demanding the rent. The time was now 11.30 p.m. He was observed to be strange in his manner by the irate tenant who persuaded him to go home. In this case, the journey had been made in failing light and the ordinarv landmarks did not provide the visual clues which serve to maintain proper orientation. This fact, together with an organic impairment of memory which had hitherto passed unnoticed, brought about a state of disorientation. This disorientation was complete for time of day and partial for place. But despite this the patient carried out, if in an inadequate and semi-automatic way, the purpose with which he had originally set out.
This episode was the first sign of general paresis in a healthv man who had been satisfactorily treated eighteen vears before. It shows cognitive restriction and also the w%Nav in which a restriction of the perceptual field due to black-out conditions reinforces the effects of an organic retention defect. Fatigue, which interferes with remembering in normal persons, may exaggerate a mild memory retention defect. The influence of what is immediatelv past no longer has its normal controlling effect. The individual is in consequence more strongly predisposed to dissociated behaviour. Similar phenomena occur in epilepsy, but often in a more dramatic wav. Thev were studied in detail by Hughlings Jackson (1931) who gave them the name of "mental 3>5r Section of Psychiatry 575 automatism". "It is convenient", he wvrites, "to have one name for all kinds of doings after epileptic fits from slight vagaries up to homicidal actions. Hence I use the term mental automatism'. I sav 'mental' as the doings are probably external signs of epileptic dreams". Neurological textbooks as a rule restrict the term automatism to epileptic phenomena. Most psvchiatrists, however, take a wider conception and Henderson and Gillespie (1927) , for example, consider that automatism may be local or general, and if general that the concept should include somnambulisms and fugues.
An interesting example of automatism in Jackson's sense of the term recently came to our notice. A voung London University graduate received a severe head injury with gross cerebral contusion resulting in marked atrophy of the right frontal lobe. He developed a post-traumatic epilepsy of particular severitv frequently leading to a status epilepticus. Large amouLnts of drugs modified these attacks but he had in their place episodes of automatic behaviour. When walking along a street in Sheffield he would suddenly experience a strong paramnesia that he was back as a student in London. He would next find himself on a bus perhaps a mile from where he had boarded it. At this point he would have a confused feeling that he was in London and would have to inquire as to his whereabouts. He had no recollection of actuallv boarding the bus. It appeared that as an undergraduate he had made a regular daily bus journey to college. In his confused state he believed that he was making the same journey, although of course he was really in Sheffield. The mechanism of automatism wouild thus appear to depend on a sudden failure of the processes that maintain normal consciousness.
The outcome is a restriction of consciousness with failure-in Lewis's (1932) term to actualize the present. The similaritv of this behaviour to that set up artificiallv bv the hvpnotist's command cannot be overlooked. For the period in the bus this man had no recall although his hehaviour appeared unexceptionable. This post-traumatic automatism resembles closely the isolated episodes of maladaptive behaviour I described in the earlier cases.
The most common tvpe of amnesic episode is associated with emotional stress where there is no question of an organic lesion. When it involves wandering the episode is generally known as a fugue and the term is best confined to this meaning (Stengel, 1943) . But amnesic states developed on an emotional basis, though not involving overt wanderinig, resemble the fugue in being dissociated from the continuity of normal conduct.
A young van driver, within the course of a week, had had three relatively short periods of amnesia ranging from half to one hour in duration. These attacks had occurred while he was driving his van and on each occasion he found himself some distance off his proper route with no recollection of how he came to be there. Epilepsy was considered and rejected. Investigation showed that the patient had beeni brought up strictly and without affection by a stepmother who compared him unfavourably with her own son. Brow-beaten and thwarted, he satisfied his earlv ambitionis bv recourse to fantasy. He was bright and intelligent but had been obliged to leave school at 14 and start to work. He ran awav to sea and later joined the Armv from which he secured his discharge. He settled down to civil life with an overwhelming ambition to become a professional footballer. In an important trial match his team was hopelessly beaten and his hope and pride dashed in the eyes of his friends. Three davs later he had his first attack of amnesia. He came to himself to find that he had driven his van two miles out of town and was quite unaware how he had come to this spot. He was intensely pre-occupied with his disappointments and depressed at the vanishing chances of realizing his ambitions.
In this ill-knit personality the intense emotional pre-occupation wvith his misfortune had allowed him to drive his van for two miles in what appeared to be an entirelv automatic manner and he was unable to account for the aberration. But from this moment onwards the failure of recall became for him a svmptom explaining his personal shortcomings. In his mood of depression here was a solution to his problems, and twvo similar episodes were repeated within a week.
The next case illustrates amnesia for a period of dissociated behaviour following a severe emotional trauma. The patient was a healthy man of over-conscientious and sensitive temperament. There was no history of overt neurotic traits. He was driving a heavy truck when it overturned, pinning the occupants beneath it and inflicting fatal injuries on one of them. The driver, our patient, in extreme pain believed that he was dving. He was quickly released and got to his feet apparently uninjured. Seeing his friend horribly mutilated his behaviour suddenly became wild. Oblivious of evervone on the scene, he made no attemipt to co-operate in the rescue work but rushed about shouting and tried single-handed to uproot a tree trunk wvith which to lever up the lorry. His consciousness appeared to be restricted to this one urge to release his friend, but blind to any practical method of carrying it out. So troublesome and obstructive was his behaviour that he had to be led away. Following his admission to hospital he took no apparent notice of his environment and constantly muttered that he had killed his friend. The patient was in a semi-stuporous state for several days. On recovery of normal consciousness he was able to recall the accident up to the time of his own extrication from the truck. He also remembered the transient belief that he was dying. He could recall seeing his friend horribly mutilated but he had no recollection whatsoever of what happened after this.
We induced a state of mild narcosis by sodium amytal and he was then able to relate the whole story of his wild behaviour. After recovery from its effects there was complete inability to recall both the original experience and its narration in narco-hypnosis.
This period of abnormal behaviour resembles the automatic'dissociated states already described in organic cases. The etiology is different. Some would see in the forgetting of the traumatic episode in the last case an example of repression. But there are features in his later behaviour other than its mere painfulness preventing recall. The patient was quite distraught after his release from the van. His cognitive activity was isolated aild restricted. The emotional drive to release his friend was expressed so grossly thaMit precluded all reasonable measures of effecting its end. As in other cases described, these states are seldom accessible to normal memory. Only in the restricted setting induced by narcosis could the traumatic episode be reinstated and described. The resemblance between this case and the hypnotic state is obvious.
There are important points of similarity between the different types of dissociated state whatever their actiology. After acute emotional stress we have seen the same cognitive and emotional isolation of the reaction and proneness to later amnesia as in organic cases.
It may be objected that, in some functional cases at least, the memories apparently lost can be reinstated under suitable conditions and that this is not the case for the organic dissociated states. In the latter cases with true memory impairment we have no method of ascertaining whether the memories involved are recoverable or not. In them the effect of induced narcosis is usually to set up a state of confusion or to intensify an existing confusion. Some authors, however, have claimed that amnesia for relatively short periods, due for instance to alcoholic intoxication, can be cleared up by hypnotic procedures. This suggests that the differences between organic and functional dissociated states may be less profound than is often thought. I believe that a closer study of the behaviour actually displayed in these cases of different oetiology may open the road to a more satisfactory neuropsychiatry of amnesia.
[My thanks are due to Dr. William McAlister, Medical Superintendent of this hospital for access to these cases; they have been studied under the auspices of and with the assistance of the Rockefeller Foundation and University of Edinburgh.]
